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Mass layoffs give rise to groups of unemployed workers who possess
similar characteristics and therefore may learn from one another's expe-
rience searching for a new job. Two factors lead them to be too selective
in the job offers that they accept. The first is an information externality:
searchers fail to take into account the value of their experience to others.
The second is an incentive to free ride: each worker would like others to
experiment and reveal information concerning productive jobs. Together
these forces imply that in equilibrium the natural rate of unemployment
is too high.
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Following the seminal work of Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968), much anal-
ysis of the natural rate of unemployment has focused on the relationship between
allocative shocks and job search. Allocative shocks shift the demand for labor
across products and locations and create an incentive for workers to move from
one job to another. Frictional unemployment arises because it takes time and
effort for the workers who relocate to find appropriate new jobs. There are by
now many models concerning the connection between the allocative shocks, the
search process, and the level and efficiency of the natural rate of unemployment,
including Lucas and Prescott (1974), Hall (1979), Diamond (1981), and Mortensen
(1982).
A common feature of these classical models of search unemployment is that a
laid off worker just takes another draw from the distribution of wages in the econ-
omy. We believe that this trivializes the adjustment problem that an unemployed
worker faces. The question facing this worker is often not whether to accept a
given wage offer, but where even to begin looking for employment. What sectors
are hiring? In what jobs will the worker be productive? Where are these jobs
located?
Given the uncertainty that surrounds their adjustment decision, workers have
an incentive to use all of the information at their disposal. In addition to their
own search experience, they are likely to find the experience of others informative,
especially the experience of other unemployed workers with similar characteristics
who face similar adjustment decisions. In this paper, we analyze the incentives
that confront a group of searchers who simultaneously find themselves unemployed
due to a mass layoff. We examine the how the possibility of learning, from others
affects search behavior and the equilibrium rate of unemployment.
Labor market research suggests that learning from the example of other work-
ers may help the unemployed overcome many of the difficulties inherent in ad-
justment. Somewhere between one half and two thirds of all jobs are obtained
through connections with friends and relatives, and one prominent explanation
for the prevalence of such informal channels is informational: a worker and a firm
can learn about the quality of their match from the matches of others.1 Rees (1966)
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 See Montgomery (1991) for a brief overview of this literature.
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writes:
Employee referrals—the most important informal channel—usually pro-
vide good screening for employers who are satisfied with their present
workforce. Present employees tend to refer people like themselves... The
informal sources also have important benefits to the applicant. He can
obtain much more information from a friend who does the kind of work
in which he is interested than from an ad in the paper or a counselor at
an employment agency.
Wanous (1992), in a study of recruitment methods, adds that:
Newcomers from an inside source are a better "match" to the orga-
nization because they had the opportunity to drop out from further
consideration [Recruits from outside sources] will have substantial
amounts of misinformation.
Finally, in a recent empirical study, Staiger (1990) concludes that his "evidence
suggests that a personal contact may provide information that helps an individual
find a good match."
There are times, however, when unemployed workers are likely to possess few
useful connections and hence little information about their matches with firms.
For example, if the shock that lead to the workers' unemployment was common to
the sector or the region in which they were employed, then it is very likely that the
workers will need to find new employment in unfamiliar locations or unfamiliar
fields, and that many of the channels through which they normally would have
obtained jobs will have been destroyed.
At such times there is another feature of labor markets that interacts with
the fact that workers can learn from the experience of others: a large proportion
of job losses result from mass layoffs. Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) report that
plant closings account for 25% of job destruction, whereas plants in which the
workforce contracts by less than 20% account for less than 25% of job destruction.
The fact that workers are laid off in groups means that an unemployed worker
has a natural peer group of fellow unemployed workers with similar skills and
characteristics. Given that the members of this group face a major adjustment
problem and are similar in many ways, there is the possibility that they may
learn from one another's search. Has any other member of the group found a job?
Where and in what sector? Have they succeeded at the job or is it a bad match?
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As these questions indicate, the process of the group gradually rebuilding its stock
of information is riddled with informational spillovers. We focus on the way in
which these informational spillovers affect worker reallocation and the natural rate
of unemployment.
In this paper we develop a simple model of the natural rate of unemploy-
ment in which interactions among searchers are central. The basic microeconomic
mechanism that we describe is one in which a group of workers are laid off and
begin to search for new jobs. They learn about their suitability for different types
of employment not only through their own search but also by watching the success
or failure on the job of other workers with similar characteristics. It is the ability
to learn from others that differentiates our model from previous models of search
unemployment.
We show that this learning channel produces a natural rate of unemployment
that is suboptimally high. The source of the inefficiency is the presence of an
information externality and a free rider problem. Searchers have no incentive to
take into account the value to others of the information revealed by their own
search activity, but rather have an incentive to sit back and wait for others to
reveal information through their search. Both of these effects lead searchers to be
too selective in equilibrium. By waiting for others to reveal information, searchers
fail to accept jobs that would provide valuable information to others.
While our emphasis on information externalities is new, we are not the first
to develop models in which the natural rate of unemployment is inefficient. Tobin
(1972) argued that congestion externalities would lead to a suboptimally high nat-
ural rate, a perspective that has recently been applied to Eastern European unem-
ployment by Gavin (1992). Mortensen (1982) argued that meetings between work-
ers and firms are a situation of bilateral monopoly; workers who reject matches
fail to take into consideration the firm's rents and hence reject matches too often,
implying again that the natural rate is too high. Diamond (1982) and Howitt
(1988), on the other hand, show that thick market externalities may imply that
the natural rate of unemployment is too low. Search is efficient in the model of
Lucas and Prescott (1974).
Our approach also complements the existing literature on connections and em-
ployment. Formal models of this mechanism analyze why workers would choose
to use connections to find employment [Holzer (1988)] or why workers with con-
nections might earn higher wages than those who lack connections [Montgomery
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(1991), Mortensen and Vishwanath (1992), and Staiger (1990)]. To these we add
the possibility that shocks to a sector or a region might leave unemployed workers
with few connections to employed workers, and that group interactions may lead
to suboptimal search in the presence of connections among unemployed workers.
In formal terms, the model that we develop is most closely related to our
model of information spillovers and search in real estate markets [Caplin and
Leahy (1993a)]. Other related models of information spillovers include the work
of Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992), Caplin and Leahy
(1993b, 1993c, 1993d), and Rob (1991). Caplin and Leahy (1993b) and Atkeson
and Kehoe (1992) present models in which sectoral reallocation destroys informa-
tional capital and reduces output; these models differ from the model contained in
this paper in that Caplin and Leahy do not model search, and Atkeson and Kehoe
do not model group learning.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 motivates our model of search
with information spillovers and lays out the main assumptions. The solution to
the model is presented in Section 3. Section 4 contains many of the main results
including a discussion of the information externality and the free rider problem,
a proof of the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, and a demonstration that
the natural rate is inefficient. Section 5 discusses various extensions to the model.
Section 6 concludes.
2. A MODEL OF SEARCH WITH INFORMATION SPILLOVERS
We consider an economy with a continuum of different worker types indexed
by i G [0,1] and a continuum of distinct industries indexed by j £ [0,1]. There
are N workers of each type i and a continuum of firms of each type j . Each firm
has a single job opening.
As in Jovanovic (1979), the fundamental allocative problem for the economy
is to match workers to firms in which they are productive. We assume that there
are two components to a worker's productivity, an idiosyncratic component <j) that
is specific to the match between a particular worker and firm, and a common
component A,j that influences the productivity of all workers of type i in industry
j . The driving force in the model is AtJ-. Fluctuations in this parameter will
necessitate labor reallocation, and the fact that the parameter is common across
workers of type i will form the basis for learning during the adjustment process.
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We assume that AtJ- follows a Markov process taking either the value zero
which makes a worker completely unproductive in the industry or one which cor-
responds to high productivity. The transition probabilities between these two
states are as follows: given that AtJ- is equal to one in period £, the probability
that it is equal to zero in period J + 1 is s, and given that A;J is equal to zero in
period t, the probability that it is equal to one in period t + 1 is equal to v. We
assume that these transitions are independent across industry and worker types.
The assumptions on A,j have two implications. First, because transitions are
independent across worker types, type i workers can learn nothing about their pro-
ductivity in an industry from observing the productivity of workers of other types.
Second, when Xij becomes zero, all type i workers in industry j become unproduc-
tive and simultaneously begin to search elsewhere. This last property corresponds
to the notion of mass layoffs in which many similar workers simultaneously find
themselves unemployed.
We now describe the process of search when the entire group of N type i
workers simultaneously find themselves unemployed. We assume that workers
are risk neutral and that they choose their search strategies to maximize the
expected present value of wages using discount rate /?. Wages are assumed equal
to the marginal productivity of workers, <j>\ij. Initially the only information that
workers possess is their prior information concerning the distribution of job offers
across the economy. The distribution of AtJ- is determined by the Markov process.
We assume that each idiosyncratic component <f> is an independent draw from a
uniform distribution on [0,1].
In the first period of unemployment, each worker visits a single firm with
a vacant job and receives an imperfect signal of their productivity on that job.
The worker then must decide whether to accept or reject the job based on this
signal and on the worker's prior beliefs. If they reject, they remain unemployed
and receive nothing. If they accept they pay a cost c and receive their marginal
product <f>X{j. They remain in the job so long as Xij equals one. The cost and
irreversibility of job acceptance mean that accepting a job is an expensive and
risky option. This will provide an incentive for workers to wait for others to reveal
information about an industry through their search.
In the second period of unemployment, each worker who rejected a job gets
to pick a new firm to search in. The key assumption is that they also have an
opportunity to learn from the success or failure of others' search in the first period,
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and to use this information to guide their search activity. In order for observation
of others' job acceptance to be valuable, it must be that it improves understanding
of the common factor Xij. In general this would be a complicated signal extraction
problem. We make two assumptions that simplify learning without altering the
basic incentives affecting search. First, once one worker of type i accepts a job,
not only does this worker observe the common factor but so do all workers of
type i. Second, the private signal that workers receive upon approaching a firm
is simply the idiosyncratic component of productivity <J), so that workers learn
nothing about AtJ- prior to acceptance.
This learning mechanism implies that if no other worker accepted a job in the
first period, then the group learns nothing and will continue their blind process
of search in the second period. If, on the other hand, anyone accepted a job in
the first period, all workers learn their productivity in that industry. If workers of
type i learn that they are productive in industry j , they will have an incentive to
search there, whereas if they learn that they are unproductive they will have an
incentive to search somewhere else. In all subsequent periods search proceeds as
in the second. In general, workers' search policies depend on whether or not the
workers know that the industry in which they are searching is productive.
Note that the model as constructed is agnostic as to exactly how information
passes among workers. One possible scenario is that workers observe the wage paid
to employed individuals, and if this wage is positive they infer that the common
factor is one. Another possibility is that workers observe whether the individual
stays on the job or returns to the pool of searchers and infer from this the value
of Xij. Finally, workers might learn that an industry is a good one directly by
communicating with employed workers of their type.
We place one additional restriction on the search process: we assume that all
workers of type i search for employment in the same industry j . This simplifies
the aggregation, because it prevents the group of N type i workers from splitting
because two or more find employment in separate industries. It also ensures that
all type i workers are laid off simultaneously when Xij becomes zero. Relaxing this
assumption complicates the analysis, but gives rise to interesting phenomenon con-
cerning an individual worker's decision whether or not to experiment by searching
in other industries. We discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption in
Section 5.
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At the economy-wide level, the picture that emerges is one of many groups
of workers searching for employment in a variety of markets. Members of each
group sample firms in the same market. If one of them chooses to take a job,
then all learn their productivity in that market. If this productivity is high they
will choose to search further in this market. If it is low they will choose to search
elsewhere. At the same time that the unemployed are searching for employment,
the employed are losing their productive jobs at a rate s.
In this setting we look for a steady state Nash equilibrium in search strategies.
The model is structured so that workers are in one of three states. They are either
employed or, if unemployed, they either know of a good industry or are completely
uninformed. Employed workers make no strategic decisions. They remain on the
job until they become unproductive. A strategy for an unemployed worker consists
of rules describing which jobs to accept in each of the two states of unemployment.
The structure of the model is simple enough that in the next section we show that
both rules are of the reservation variety. Therefore the Nash equilibrium has two
parameters (j> and <f> that describe the reservation acceptance levels. Once we have
solved for <f) and <^ , we can use the steady state distribution of workers between
employment and the two unemployed states to complete the characterization of
equilibrium and the natural rate.
DEFINITION: An equilibrium consists of search cutoff rules <f> for the unin-
formed searcher and (f> for the informed searcher such that it is optimal for each
uninformed worker to accept jobs if and only if<f>> cj) and each informed worker
to accept jobs if and only if (j) > <f> provided others are pursuing this strategy.
We need to place one restriction on the parameters in order for the model
to be interesting. For any search to take place, we need that the ex ante present
discounted value of a job with the highest idiosyncratic match component be
greater than the cost of accepting employment. As we shall see below the expected
value of wages earned on a job for which <f> is equal to one is (J7^)(1_Q}1_3\). We
need this to be greater than c.
Overall the data of model are N, 3, v, c, and (3. The first measures the size
of layoffs; the second and third concern the amount of sectoral reallocation; the
fourth is the cost of experimentation; and the last is the discount rate. In the next
sections we show that given these data there is a unique equilibrium and describe
how changes in the parameters effect the equilibrium rate of unemployment.
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3. THE SOLUTION TO THE MODEL
We begin by analyzing the optimal search policy of a collection of N workers
of the same type. We then imbed this search strategy into an aggregate framework.
A. Optimal Search
The search behavior of workers will depend on whether or not previous search
has revealed markets with high Xij. We must therefore consider searching workers
in two states: an uninformed state in which the worker must search for a productive
market, and an informed state in which the worker limits search to markets which
are known to have Xij equal to one.
Let V((f)) denote the value the optimal search strategy for an uninformed
worker who currently possesses an idiosyncratic match component </>. The worker
has two choices: accept the job or ignore the current offer and wait for the next
period. V(<f)) is simply the maximum of these two choices,
where A is the expected value of accepting the job and W is the expected value
of waiting.
The value of accepting is:
A = ap<f> + aps(3Ve + (1 - p)(3Ve - c,
where a = 1/(1 — (3(1 — .s)), p = v/(s -+- i>), and Ve denotes the unconditional
expectation of V(</>). To understand this equation note that if a worker accepts a
job, the worker pays c and observes the common component Xij. The probability
that the common component is high is equal to the steady state proportion of
industries with Xij equal to one. Given the transition probabilities s and v, it
follows that this probability is equal to p. If the common component is high then
the worker receives the wage </> so long as the job survives. Good matches expire
with probability s so that the present value of wages is a</>. When a match expires
all workers of type i become unemployed and uninformed. Hence when a match
expires the worker receives the expected value of being in the uninformed state. If
a worker discovers that the common component is low upon accepting a job, then
again the worker remains uninformed and receives Ve.
The value of waiting, W, will depend on the actions of others. If one worker
of type i discovers a job of type j in which Xij is one, then all workers of type i will
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benefit from the information. If, on the other hand, no agent of type i finds a good
match, all agents of type i will remain uninformed.2 Let n denote the probability
that a worker becomes informed through others' search. The value of waiting is
then,
W = /3[irJe + (1 - 7r)Ve]
where J e is the expected value of an optimal search strategy in the informed state.
Since the value of waiting is independent of the particular realization of <f>,
whereas the value of accepting is strictly increasing in <^ , the optimal policy is to
set a reservation level of <f) and to accept a job whenever (f) exceeds this level. The
reservation level <f> equates the value of accepting and waiting. A little algebra
yields
(3.1) ap4>-c = (37rJe + [(1 - TT) - (1 - p) - aps]fSVe.
We can now use <j) to calculate the expected value of an optimal search policy
in the uninformed state. If the draw of <f> is above <j> the worker accepts the job,
otherwise the worker waits. Hence
, ,<£ , i
Ve = V(4)d<f>= / Wd<(>+ [ap<f) + otps(3Ve + (l-p)(3Ve-c]d<t>.
Eliminating W and solving for Ve,
(3.2) V = —¥
We can also use (j) to calculate the probability that a worker who waits will
become informed through others search,
Here we have used the fact that in a symmetric Nash equilibrium each agent is
following strategy (f> so that the probability that at least one other agent accepts
a job is 1 — 4>N~1. This job is productive with probability p and survives with
probability 1 — s.
2
 Note that it makes no difference whether all workers reject jobs or a single worker accepts
and discovers that the industry is bad. In either case all the workers end up in the uninformed
state.
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The search decision in the informed state is quite similar. The worker chooses
between accepting a job and further search,
J O ) = max {acj) + as(3Ve - c, /9(1 - s)Je + sVe} .
Here the fact that the worker is informed implies that the probability that the
match is productive is equal to one, and the value of waiting depends on the
probability that the match will expire. Again the optimal strategy is to accept only
matches that exceed some minimal threshold <j> at which the worker is indifferent
between accepting and waiting,
(3.3) aj> + as(3Ve - c = (1 - s)/3Je + s(3Ve.
Finally, with </>, we can calculate Je:
= f (aj> + as(3Ve -c)d<f>+ I (a<f> + as/3Ve - c
Jo J6(3.4)
Equations (3.1) through ( 3.4) form a system of four equations in the four
unknowns <^ , <f>, Ve, and Je. The solution to these equations defines the equi-
librium search strategies. We now imbed this search behavior into the aggregate
framework.
B. Aggregation
The steady-state unemployment rate is determined from four parameters:
the separation rate 5, the steady state probability that a match is productive p,
and two reservation match parameters ^ and <j). As usual the way to solve for the
natural rate is to equate flows between states. Figure 1 illustrate the flows between
employment and the two states of unemployment. Let E denote the fraction of
the labor force that is currently employed, and let / and U denote the fractions
of the labor force that are informed and uninformed respectively.
The first relation between E, I and U is the adding up constraint. As pro-
portions they must sum to one,
(3.5) E + I+U = l.
The second relation between E, I and U comes from equating flows into and
out of the uninformed state,






good job acceptence / j o b a c c e p t e n c e
Figure 1
Flows into the uninformed state are the result of separations. Since each period a
fraction s of all matches between industries and types become unproductive, these
flows are s(E + / ) . The right hand side of equation ( 3.6) is the flow out of the
uninformed state. If any one of a group of iV workers of a given type i finds a
good match, then the entire group leaves the uninformed state. The probability of
this occurring is p(l — (j)N) and (1 — s) is the probability that this match survives
one period.
Finally, equating the flows into and out of employment gives us a third rela-
tionship between E, / , and £7,
(3.7) (1 - s)(l - $)I + p(l - a)(l - $)U = sE.
The right side of equation (3.7) gives the exit rate from employment. The left side
of the equation gives the entry rate which is equal to the probability of accepting
a match from each of the two unemployment states multiplied by the probability
that the match is high and the survival rate for productive matches.
We can solve equations ( 3.5)-(3.7) for the employment rate
(3.8) E =
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This completes the solution to the model.
4. ANALYSIS
A. The Free Rider Problem and the Information Externality
Several features of the model are immediately apparent from the equations.
According to equation (3.1), all else equal <j> is increasing in TT, the probability that
the worker becomes informed through others search. The possibility that search
by others will reveal information concerning the location of productive markets
therefore increases the value of waiting and causes the uninformed worker to be
more selective. Each agent therefore has an incentive to delay matching in order
to free ride off the information revealed by others. In many models, most notably
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), the incentive to free ride leads to non-existence
of equilibrium. In contrast, in Section 4B we show that there always exists an
equilibrium to this model and that this equilibrium is unique.
Another feature of the model may be seen from the definition of TT: increases
in ^ reduce TT. Therefore if one worker of type i becomes more selective, the
probability that all other workers of type i will become informed falls. Since
an individual searcher ignores this effect in choosing the cutoff ^, there is an
informational externality in the model; agents ignore the value to others of the
information revealed through their matches. The presence of this externality will
cause Nash equilibrium to be inefficient. We return to welfare issues and analyze
the social planner's problem in Section 40 below.
While we speak of the free rider problem and the information externality as
separate forces, they are really reflections of the same phenomenon. If there were
no information externality, that is if the action of one agent did not affect to
payoffs of others, then there would be no incentive to free ride. Similarly, if agents
could not wait to take advantage of the information revealed by others, then the
fact that actions reveal information would be of no importance.
B. Existence and Uniqueness
Proposition 1 demonstrates both the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 1: There exists a unique solution to equations (3.1)~(3.4) with





The proof of the proposition is contained in the appendix. The main argument
is presented in Figure 2. First we show that Ve in equation (3.2) is a quasiconcave
function of cj) and that Ve is equal to zero when ^ is equal to one. Next we show
that Ve in equation (3.1) is an increasing function of 4> and that ^ G (0,1) when
Ve is equal to zero. Finally, we show that the Ve that solve equation ( 3.1) for
a given <f> lie below the Ve that satisfy a social planners first order condition, so
that the intersection between (3.1) and (3.2) is unique and occurs to the right of
the maximum in ( 3.2).3
C. The Socially Optimal Search Strategy
In Nash equilibrium each agent chooses an optimal strategy given the strate-
gies chosen by others. In contrast, the social planner chooses all agent's strategies
simultaneously so as to maximize their collective utility. In the present situation
in which all agents are identical the planner's problem takes the form of maxi-
mizing the utility of any one agent subject to the constraint that all agents follow
symmetric strategies.
3
 The reason that equilibrium exists in spite of the presence of the free rider problem is that
reservation wage strategies are natural mixed strategies, where the mixing is done through the
draw of the idiosyncratic parameter <j>. This contrasts with the pure strategies that underlie the
famous non-existence result of Grossman and Stiglitz.
14 CAPLIN AND LEAHY
The equations that characterize the social planner's problem are not that
different from those that characterize the Nash equilibrium. Equations (3.3) and
( 3.4) continue to hold, as the determination of the cutoff in the informed state
conditional on Ve is efficient. The change is that the social planner chooses a
cutoff in the uninformed state </)* to maximize Ve in equation ( 3.2) taking into
account that TT is a function of <j>*.
Proposition 2 states that (f>* < <f>. This can be seen from Figure 2 that shows
that the intersection that determines <f> lies to the right of the maximum value of
Ve.
PROPOSITION 2: A social planner who maximizes the collective utility of
workers would choose a cutoff in the uninformed state that is lower than the Nash
equilibrium cutoff, <f>* < <j>.
PROOF: See Appendix.
The gap between <f>* and <^  is the result of the information externality and
the free rider problem. These cause searchers to be too cautious. Searchers pass
up matches that may bring valuable information and they wait for information to
be delivered by the actions of others.
Note that the social planner will also choose a lower value for <f>. This is
not due to any externality in the informed state, but rather to the fact that job
separations link valuations in the two states. For this reason increases in Ve tend
to reduce <f> as can be seen from equation ( 3.3).
Algebraic manipulation shows that dE/d^ and dE/d(f> are negative. There-
fore the fact that both <j> and <f) are inefficiently high in Nash equilibrium implies
that the natural rate of unemployment is inefficiently high as well.
The type of policies that the model suggests are policies that lead both
informed and uninformed workers to accept employment more readily. These
might include subsidizing the hiring of workers and improving the formal chan-
nels through which information is conveyed to unemployed workers. Other policies
such as unemployment insurance may exacerbate the information problem because
they reduce the incentive to accept jobs.
D. The Comparative Statics of N
Possibly the most interesting comparative static parameter in the model is
the size of a cohort N. Differentiating equation ( 3.1), ( 3.2) with respect to N
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and solving for d(f>/dN we see that increases in N raise the cutoff for acceptance
in the uninformed state
dN > Q
The inequality follows from the fact that dir/d<i> < 0, dtr/dN > 0, and Je > Ve*
The intuition underlying this result is that increases in N increase the probability
that someone else will investigate the market. This in turn increases the value
of waiting and the incentive to free ride. Hence (f> rises and each worker becomes
more selective. It is easy to see from equation (3.2) that Ve rises with ^ so that
workers are also better off the larger their cohort.
How does the social planners cutoff <j>* vary with N? There are two effects.
First, as N rises, the value of finding a good match increases as there are more
workers who will benefit from becoming informed. This effect implies that (f>*
should fall as N rises. Second, as N rises duplication of search costs becomes an
issue. The social planner wants to avoid too many searchers incurring the cost c
when the industry is unproductive. This effect implies that </>* should rise as N
rises. Simulations of the model indicate that the derivative of (j>* with respect to
N is ambiguous due to these two conflicting effects.
Another variable that has an ambiguous derivative with respect to JV is the
duration of unemployment. Let DJJ denote the expected duration in the unin-
formed state, and Dj the expected duration in the informed state, then
The expected duration of unemployment in the uninformed state is simply the
probability that the agent remains unemployed in the current period plus the
expected duration given that the agent remains unemployed. The latter depends
on whether or not the agent becomes informed. Solving for
1 — (1 — p(l — </>))(l — 7r)
The direct effect of an increase in N is to increase ir and to reduce DJJ] an
increase in 7r reduces the duration of unemployment by increasing the probability
4
 Je is greater than Ve because better information makes agents better off. A formal proof
of this fact is contained in Lemma 1 in the appendix.
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that the worker will enter the informed state where jobs come more quickly. An
increase in N however has two other effects that work in the other direction.
An increase in TV increases <f> which reduces the probability of finding a job on
one's own. An increase in N also increases Ve which increases <^> and therefore
increases the duration of unemployment in the informed state. This indicates that
the derivative of D\j with respect to N is ambiguous. Simulations of the model
showed that this was in fact the case.
Generally the longer are spells, the higher will be the natural rate of unem-
ployment. So it is not surprising that just as in duration analysis, the derivative of
E with respect to N is ambiguous. Given ^, an increase in N increases the prob-
ability that workers will become informed, and since the probability of becoming
employed from the informed state is greater than from the uninformed state, this
has the effect of increasing the employment rate. The increase in N, however, also
leads to increases in <f) and <f> that reduce the flow out of unemployment.
E. Limit Behavior
As N rises to infinity, one of two situations may occur. If limAr—,oo <f> < 1,
then ^N-1 approaches zero and TT approaches p(l — s). It is very possible, however,
that with 7T = p(l — s) the incentive to free ride is so strong that it is optimal for
a worker to set ^ equal to one. If this is the case, then as N approaches infinity,
workers become so selective that ^ approaches one and (j)N~l approaches some
limit between zero and one. Thus even as the number of searchers becomes very
large, it is not necessarily the case that information about productivity gets out
quickly. As N rises there are more workers searching, but each becomes more
selective.
5. DISCUSSION AND EXTENSIONS
In this section we discuss several issues raised by the model, as well as how
the model might be extended in the light of these issues. We organize the dis-
cussion around a series of questions: What is the nature of the group interaction
among searchers? When is group search likely to be important? What happens
if searchers may recall prior offers? What are the incentives to experiment by
searching in other industries? We take up these questions in turn.
A. The Nature of the Interaction among Searchers
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As it is modelled, the information externality and the free rider problem affect
the cutoff for accepting a job. It is clear that there are many other margins upon
which these forces might operate. For example, the results would have been similar
if the crucial decision that a searcher had to make was how much effort to expend
in finding a job. In deciding how hard to search, a worker might not take account
of the benefits search provides others. The worker would also have an incentive
to relax and allow others to expend effort on search. Similarly the margin might
involve the decision to move to a new location or to develop new skills. Each of
these decisions involve potential information spillovers, and therefore the potential
for insufficient search.
There is one potential interaction that appears to introduce an incentive for
excessive search. Suppose that there were only M jobs in each industry, and that
M is less than the number of workers of type N. The fact that there are fewer
jobs than searchers appears to create an incentive to be the first one to accept a
job in an industry, since then one is assured of a productive job, whereas followers
may be left out.5 This argument, however, ignores the fact that unless the number
of productive industries is also limited, the ability to search elsewhere places a
floor on the value of being unemployed. The fact that someone else accepts a job
appears more likely to help via the information channel than to hurt by making
jobs scarce. The fact that someone else accepts a job cannot be harmful, unless
the total number of jobs for a specific type of worker is limited.
B. When is Group Search Important?
Group search is likely to be important when two conditions are met. First, it is
necessary that there be a group of unemployed workers with similar characteristics
who can learn from one another's search. As discussed in the introduction this
is likely to be the case when there are mass layoffs. Workers from the same
firm are likely to share many of the same skills, as well as social and economic
characteristics. The second condition is that workers lack perfect channels of
information concerning the location of productive jobs, so that they value the
information that they might obtain from others' search.
It is clear that shocks will differ in how well they meet these conditions.
For example, large, permanent shocks are more likely to lead to plant closings
5
 In general, this sort of behavior need not lead to a lower unemployment rate. See Jovanovic
(1987).
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and mass layoffs, whereas shocks to a sector or region are more likely to destroy
information channels. Idiosyncratic shocks to a firm, on the other hand, may
destroy less information. Workers who are laid off from a struggling firm in a
thriving industry or region may have friends in other firms in the industry or
region through which they can obtain jobs. In such cases, learning from other
unemployed workers may prove to be less important.
We can easily amend the model to include both industry and firm specific
shocks. We only have to note that separation need not necessarily send a worker
into the uninformed state. If the separation is due to a firm shock the worker
enters the informed state instead. The worker loses a job, but not the knowledge
that the industry is productive.
Suppose that industry shocks occur with probability S{ and firm shocks occur
with probability Sf. Then defining a = 1/(1 — /3(1 — s,- — Sf), equations (3.1) and
(3.3) are amended as follows
(3.1') apj> + asiPf3Ve + asfpf]Je + (1 - p)/3Ve -c = Trj3Je - (1 - 7r
(3.3') a</> + asiPVe + asf/3Je + (1 - p)/3Ve - c = (1 - Si)(3Je
Equations ( 3.2) and ( 3.4) are unaffected, n is equal to p(l — <sz)(l — 4> ).
It is straight forward to show that if we hold S{ + Sf fixed, increases in S{
raise both 0 and <f>, and hence the natural rate of unemployment. It is therefore
possible that fluctuations in the natural rate could arise from fluctuations in the
relative importance of industry and firm specific shocks.
The clean separation between shocks to industries and shocks to firms is
somewhat misleading. It makes it appear that if workers retain any connections
to other employed workers then they do not need to learn from others' search and
that they only learn from others search if all connections to employed workers
are destroyed. This is really a consequence of our simplifying assumptions on the
learning process. In general, workers face a complex signal extraction problem.
Some of the information that they receive prior to employment reflects factors
common to all workers and some of the information that they receive subsequent
to employment is idiosyncratic. In addition, the characteristics that workers share
with other workers are not one dimensional; workers share some characteristics
with some workers and other characteristics with other workers. All of this means
that there is really a continuum of shocks, each of which leads to situations in which
group search is more or less important. Each shock places a group of workers out
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of work. Their ability to learn from each other will depend on how similar they
are. Some of these workers may be well connected to workers in other industries
and may find new jobs quite easily. Others workers will lack connections and will
therefore find the information revealed through group search of some value.
C. Search with Recall
One feature of the model is that we do not allow workers to recall past job
offers. In many search models this is an innocuous assumption, since offers that
were rejected in the past will be rejected again in the present. In the current
setting, however, the possibility that uninformed workers may become informed
means that allowing recall may make a difference.
There are two possibilities depending on whether or not </> > <j> in the equi-
librium without recall. If ^ < (/>, then allowing recall makes no difference, since
recalled offers will always fall below the reservation acceptance level. The logic
is the standard one: the reservation match equates the value of accepting any
current offer and waiting, it does not matter how many current offers there are.
If, however, <j) < <j> then some offers that would be rejected in the uninformed
state would be acceptable in the informed state. If we allow recall, these offers may
be accepted as soon as it is discovered that the market is good. The possession
of these offers therefore increases the value of becoming informed and hence the
value of waiting in the uninformed state. Allowing recall in these cases will tend to
increase the incentive to free ride and raise 4>. Recall therefore raises the natural
rate of unemployment.
D. Experimentation
Possibly the most severe restriction placed upon the model was the require-
ment that all workers of a given type search in the same market. We now discuss
the implications of relaxing this assumption.
The first thing to note is that workers have an incentive to search in separate
industries. Consider a worker who accepts a job in an industry in which the
common match parameter is low. If that worker is searching in the same industry
as all other workers then there is no way that the worker can benefit from the search
behavior of others; the worker knows that because they are in the same industry
any jobs that they accept will also have low productivity. If, however, the worker
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is searching elsewhere, then it is possible that the worker will become informed
even though the industry in which the worker is searching is unproductive.
The immediate implication of the fact that workers search in different indus-
tries is that it makes aggregation difficult. It multiplies the number of possible
states in which a group of N workers might find themselves. It is possible that
several workers may find jobs in separate industries at the same time, and work-
ers' welfare will depend on how many different industries are known to have good
matches at any given time. Workers who know of only one good industry become
uninformed upon separation, whereas workers who know of several may search in
one of the surviving industries.
In spite of this apparent complexity, there are several qualitative points con-
cerning the nature of this equilibrium that may be addressed verbally.6 First, even
if all workers search in separate industries in the uninformed state, there is still
too little experimentation in the informed state. Once a worker learns of a good
industry, the worker has no incentive to continue searching elsewhere. There is,
however, a social benefit to discovering other productive industries so that workers
who lose their jobs know where to search in order to find productive ones. A social
planner may want to dedicate a small subset of workers of a given type to the task
of searching for new markets in which the common match component is high.
A second qualitative feature of such an equilibrium is that even though un-
informed workers have an incentive to search in separate industries, it is still the
case that the private incentive to diversify is not as strong as the social incentive.
To see this suppose that industries differed in their ex ante probability of having
a good match. This amendment creates an incentive to search in the best indus-
try that counteracts the incentive to search away from the crowd. There exists
some differential in the probabilities between the most promising industry and
the next most promising industry such that if all workers were searching in the
most promising industry, each worker would be indifferent between continuing to
search there and searching elsewhere. In this case there is no private incentive
to diversify search, but there is still a social incentive. Whereas a worker that
chooses to search in another market neither gains nor loses, all other workers gain.
If the most promising market turns out to be unproductive, these workers will
6
 See Caplin and Leahy (1993e) for a more formal treatment of the issues raised in this
discussion.
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need to look elsewhere for employment and will benefit from knowing the loca-
tions of other productive industries. Therefore once again there may be too little
experimentation in equilibrium.
6. CONCLUSION
We have constructed a model of job search in which unemployed workers
learn from the experience of other unemployed workers. We have shown that
this interaction among searchers leads both to an information externality and an
incentive to free ride, and that these imply that the natural rate of unemployment
is suboptimally high. The model suggests that policies designed to encourage
experimentation and improve the information possessed by the unemployed may
improve welfare.
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7. APPENDIX
We need one preliminary result in order to prove Propositions 1 and 2.
LEMMA 1: Je >Ve.
PROOF: (sketch) Let ft be the set of bounded, continuous functions F :
[0,1] —• [0,1/(1 — (3)] with the sup norm. The following defines a mapping from
O v O v O v O*
Vn(4) == max{a:p<^ -|- (aps/3 + 1 ~~ p)Vn+i ~ c">
Here TT is exogenous and held at its equilibrium level.
Let Jo = Vo = 0. It follows that J\ > V\. It also follows that Jn-i > Vn-\
implies Jn > Vn. This follows from the fact that ?r < 1 — s and when jobs are
accepted a4 + cts(3Ve > /3Ve.
Standard dynamic programming arguments show that the mapping described
above is a contraction. It therefore has a unique fixed point to which all initial
values converge. Hence our sequence converges to J e and Ve and since Jn > Vn
for all ?2, it must be the case that J e > Ve as well. This completes the proof.
Q.E.D.
One proof establishes Propositions 1 and 2.
PROPOSITION 1: There exists a unique solution to equations (3.1)-(3.4) with
4, 4 e (o,i).
PROPOSITION 2: A social planner who maximizes the collective utility of
workers would choose a cutoff in the uninformed state that is lower than the Nash
equilibrium cutoff.
PROOF: (sketch) Existence hinges on the presence of a <j> that lies between
[0,1] and satisfies equations (3.1) through (3.4). The determination of 4 is stan-
dard.
Consider equation (3.2). It gives the value of being uninformed given that
everyone follows the same policy 4 (we u s e 4 to denote an arbitrary policy and
reserve 4 f°r the Nash equilibrium):
(7-1) V = —4-
- p)p) -
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Note that when <^  equals one Ve equals zero.
We now show that equation (7.1) describes Ve as a quasiconcave function of
$>. Differentiating with respect to <j>
dVe
64 1 - (1 - 4>(l -p + asPp) - i{l - TT)/? - ^Pjfc '
Note that this derivative is positive when ^ equals one. dVe/d<f> gives the first
order condition for a social planner,
(7.2) ap4>-c+[l-p + aps]/3Ve =p(l-s)(l-N4>N~1)Je)+p(l-s)N]>N~1Ve.
The set of Ve and (j> that satisfy this first order condition have two useful prop-
erties. First, when Ve is zero, <f> £ (0,1). Second, as ^ increases, Ve increases.
Together these properties imply that Ve has a single maximum. This is because
when Ve from equation (7.1) satisfies equation (7.2) it must have a zero deriva-
tive, but since the locus of solutions to equation ( 7.2) is increasing this is only
possible at one point. Hence Ve is quasiconcave.
The Nash equilibrium Ve and <j> must satisfy both equation (7.1) and the first
order condition (3.1)
3.1 ap4>-c = 7r/3Je + [(1 - TT/3 - (1 - p)/? - aps(3]Ve.
The important property of this equation is that given <j> the Ve that solves (3.1)
lies below the Ve that satisfies the social planners first order condition. This
implies that (3.1) intersects (7.1) at a point in which <^  is greater than the social
maximum and Ve is less than the social maximum. This completes the proof.
Q.E.D.
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